The Psychological Mechanisms of Oppression: Empathy, Disgust, and the Perception of Group Membership by Harris, Alexander
Oregon Undergraduate Research Journal 
7.1 (2014)     ISSN: 2160-617X 
ourj.uoregon.edu 
 
 
 
*Alexander J. Harris is an undergraduate student at the University of Oregon working to complete degrees in both 
Philosophy and Political Science. His main interests are political and social philosophy (mostly in the Pragmatist 
tradition of John Dewey), Latin and Native American politics, and modern environmental issues. Alex plans to 
attend the University of Washington School of Law and someday practice environmental law in either Oregon or 
Washington. Please send all correspondence to alex.harris24@gmail.com 
	  
 
The Psychological Mechanisms of Oppression: Empathy, 
Disgust, and the Perception of Group Membership 
Alexander Harris,* Philosophy  
ABSTRACT 
From a psychological standpoint, the oppression and marginalization of certain groups 
can be understood on the basis of two emotional mechanisms, empathy and disgust. 
This essay seeks to illuminate how both emotions are heavily modulated by the 
perception of group membership and how both show the capability to be heavily 
influenced by social and cultural contexts. This cultural prejudice works by determining 
what markers of difference (such as skin color or religion) are socially salient, which 
allows groups to build hierarchies based on those differences that would otherwise 
remain irrelevant. This paper does not seek to justify group domination as an organic 
product of psychology, but rather to merely give an account of how the psychological 
phenomena of disgust and empathy accentuate and collapse, respectively, the borders 
between people on the basis of in-group and out-group perception. Using the results of 
psychological tests, the author draws out certain arguments that are philosophically 
telling as well as politically relevant. Taken together, the social and psychological 
construction of differences between racial groups in the United States has altered how 
and when empathy and disgust have been elicited, and has thereby facilitated the 
reification of extraordinarily oppressive and atrocious group biases into a strict 
hierarchal system. With this understanding of how group oppression is able to take 
place on a psychological level we can better understand what can be done to mitigate 
the negative effects of in-group, out-group interaction.  
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
From a psychological standpoint, the oppression and marginalization of certain groups can 
be understood on the basis of two emotional mechanisms: empathy and disgust. Both emotions 
are heavily modulated by the perception of group membership and show the capability to be 
heavily influenced by social and cultural contexts. This cultural prejudice works by determining 
what markers of difference (such as skin color or religion) are socially salient, which allows 
groups to build hierarchies based on those differences that would otherwise remain irrelevant. 
This paper does not seek to justify group domination as an organic product of psychology, but 
rather to merely give an account of how the psychological phenomena of disgust and empathy 
accentuate and collapse, respectively, the borders between people on the basis of in-group and 
out-group perception. Taken together, the social and psychological construction of differences 
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between racial groups in the United States has altered how and when empathy and disgust have 
been elicited, and has thereby facilitated the reification of extraordinarily oppressive and 
atrocious group biases into a strict hierarchal system.  
 
2. EMPATHY 
Empathy is an affective mechanism that facilitates pro-social motivation and behavior 
toward in-group members. Empathy allows an individual to vicariously experience the emotions 
and thoughts of another person without having direct communication with that person. This has 
served as an aid to understanding another’s need as well as a motivating impetus to fulfill that 
need. This affective mechanism acts as a catalyst for cooperation and coordination amongst 
individuals, ultimately resulting in the net benefit of the parties involved. Studies show that 
empathic responses to the perception of pain in another involve an affective response, but not a 
sensory response of the pain experienced (Singer et al. 1157-1158). Thus, while empathy is 
commonly compared to stepping into the shoes of another, one never fully occupies these shoes 
because one cannot literally experience the sensory pain of another person. Nonetheless, 
empathy builds strong in-group ties that lead to extraordinary displays of altruism and self-
sacrifice through bridging the gap between otherwise disparate individuals with strong affective 
responses. 
How exactly does empathy build strong ties among individuals in a group? To answer this 
question, an important component of empathy must be identified. An individual will experience 
a greater affective response when observing the pain or suffering of an in-group member than 
she will experience when observing the pain or suffering of an out-group member. In other 
words, the intensity of an individual’s empathic response to the observance of pain is largely 
determined by her perception of whether or not the victim is one of her own group (us) or a 
member of a different group (them). The elicitation of this affective response constructs a bond 
between the self and the victim, a bond that is very often strong enough to motivate and 
galvanize the observer into taking action to prevent the further suffering of the victim. 
Contreras-Huerta et al. expand on this extraordinary aspect of empathy by comparing the 
neural empathic responses of perceived pain across racial lines. Their project is organized to 
answer two simple questions: does racial difference modulate empathic responses to pain, and if 
so, how does racial difference operate in the modulation of empathy? They attempted to answer 
these questions by testing the empathic reactions of Caucasian-Australians. The researchers, 
through a series of affective priming tasks, successfully created a minimal group paradigm, 
which is merely an artificial group created on a random basis. For example, a minimal group 
paradigm would be created if a teacher split a classroom full of students in half based on their 
birthday and then gave one group red hats and the other blue hats. The researchers in the 
Contreras-Huerta et al. study used this technique to create two groups and primed the 
participants until they showed strong association with and preferences for the group they were 
assigned. Once the participants had been primed, they were tested in an fMRI scanner to see if 
their empathic responses corresponded with the observed pain of in-group and out-group 
members. Surprisingly, despite the explicit identification with their group just moments before, 
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the participants experienced no more neural empathic affect to the observed pain of their in-
group members than they did of the observed pain of out-group members. 
Simultaneously, the researchers tested to see if racial biases were present in the reactions of 
the participants. Prior to the fMRI tests, the participants showed no aversion or preference to 
racial groups, but only to the groups to which they had been primed (groups created by the 
minimal group paradigm); however, the fMRI scans revealed that the observance of pain across 
racial lines resulted in a significantly diminished empathic response compared to the response 
of observed pain within racial categories. To further clarify, when Australian participants viewed 
Chinese participants getting poked with a needle, the Australian viewers experienced less 
empathic affect than they did when they viewed a fellow Australian getting poked with a needle. 
From these results, Contreras-Huerta et al. argue, “Race has been demonstrated as a feature 
impossible to ignore in facial processing, even when race is implicit and not relevant to the 
participant’s task. Thus, it is possible that race may cause an automatic and bottom-up bias in 
empathic neural activation of pain” (Contreras-Huerta et al. 8).  
The authors of this experiment posit that race may likely operate at a more basic level than 
broader social distinctions. My objection to this interpretation is twofold. Firstly, they base their 
conclusions on the fact that even though the participants of the survey showed clear group 
biases before the fMRI tests, the test results showed no difference in perceived pain across their 
primed group lines. Since the assignment to these groups was arbitrary and ultimately non-
committal, I argue that the psychological affect associated with the membership of these 
fabricated groups was necessarily weak. The saliency of a social group is likely to be more 
pronounced if there is historical and symbolic baggage associated with the group and if that 
baggage is constitutive of group members’ identity. Since the minimal group paradigm 
constructed by the researchers comes with no such baggage, it cannot be representative of other 
social groups, groups laden with symbolism and historic ties. Secondly, Contreras-Huerta et al. 
argue that race has such a deep impact on empathic responses because of the saliency of its 
physical cues (i.e. skin color), whereas the group membership of the participants was not 
associated with any physical cue. I argue that race has such a potent influence on empathic 
responses only because it has historically been rendered as a socially significant indicator of 
group membership on the basis of these physical cues. In other words, skin color is not just a 
spectrum of shades, but also a spectrum of social indicators that have historically, and still do, 
have an enormous impact on how people are organized materially, economically, politically, and 
culturally. Therefore, these phenotypical markers come with certain social baggage that causes 
the individual to psychologically determine in-group, out-group members, which thereby 
modulates her empathic responses. In a word, racial bias in empathic responses is not an 
organic, inevitable reality (bottom-up empathic discrimination), but instead an informed and 
learned bias that applies to all in-group, out-group interactions (top-down empathic 
discrimination). 
To prove that group membership, and not race, is the paramount factor in determining the 
degree of empathic response, it is necessary to consider what effect real-world social categories, 
such as religion or culture, have on individuals. When Emile G. Bruneau et al. conducted an 
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fMRI test on the elicitation of empathy in Arabs and Israelis, the scans not only revealed a 
significantly diminished degree of empathic affect in the individual who observed pain in a 
member of the opposite group, but also more involvement in the prefrontal cortex. This region 
of the brain is responsible for discriminating between conflicting thoughts and then making 
decisions in accordance to the superior thought. This suggests that in some instances, the 
prefrontal cortex informs the physiological empathy system of the victim’s out-group status, 
resulting in the weaker elicitation of empathy. This kind of “top-down” modulation of the 
empathic response illustrates that the group categories have cognitive significance and play an 
integral role in determining the empathic reaction.  
To push this further, imagine a world where people are born with much greater phenotypical 
diversity within racial groups than usual.. In this world, skin color, hair density, eye shape, and 
lip size would all be equally as physically salient as they are in real life; however, they would not 
carry any social significance. Since physical differences would not line up with social group 
categories, they would have as much social significance as eye color or belly button shape have 
in our world. Because, in our world, race has historically had such social saliency, and since 
none of us have ever known the world without such importance placed on phenotype, race is 
psychologically treated as an indicator of group membership. I argue that this treatment is not 
“natural” or “inevitable”, but rather somewhat arbitrary and historically contingent. Therefore, 
this kind of psychological process in only “bottom-up” in the sense that it takes place at a very 
subconscious level, and not in the sense that we are biologically hardwired to feel strong 
aversions to different skin colors. Therefore, those group categories, such as race, that carry 
social significance and physically salient cues modulate and regulate the empathic reaction 
elicited in members of different groups. Since racial categories in the United States have always 
had major social, political, legal, and moral significance, and since these categories have been 
based on phenotypical markers, the actual empathy experienced by white Americans towards 
racial minority groups has likely been modulated and diminished. 
From this view, it may seem appropriate to assume that one’s empathy is modulated by the 
difference between herself and the victim she observes; however, it is not the difference between 
individuals that modulates neural empathic responses, but merely the perception of difference 
that is responsible. This perception is highly susceptible to culturally acquired prejudice, 
prejudice which is very often not the accidental product of social interactions, but rather the 
product of a cold, calculated agenda to dominate and oppress. Indeed, the dominant group 
generally chooses which differences should be considered socially salient and ignores those 
differences that hinder their agenda to control. Thus, skin color is rendered as a telling social 
characteristic, a sign of fundamental difference from the “neutral” white man, and his inferiors. 
By depicting racial differences as socially relevant indicators, the dominant group becomes 
convinced of these differences, prompting a recalibration of their empathic ties to the lesser 
group. Their dearth of empathy towards out-group members further confirms their conviction of 
their differences, for now in addition to telling themselves these differences exist they also feel 
the dissimilarities.  
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The fade in empathy for those who seemingly belong to different groups contributes to 
propagate and nourish rigid social hierarchies, and thus is dangerous to social egalitarianism. 
Situations in which racial minorities undergo severe suffering and misery fail to elicit strong 
affective responses in the dominant majority group. The dearth of affective content results in a 
lack of motivation or desire to change the conditions that gave rise to the suffering, especially 
when those conditions are economically beneficial to the dominant group. Unfortunately, those 
who are a part of the dominant group are likely to be in a position of power to prevent the 
suffering of minority groups.  However, the dominant group lacks the affective response 
necessary to act altruistically towards other groups and thus generates a deep sense of apathy 
that bleeds into the political and social centers of power. This indifference allows for the 
justification of extremely unequal policies that perpetuate and maintain the systemic modes of 
dominance that originally produced the racial differences in the first place. The feedback loop is 
completed when oppressive policies breed tangible, material inequalities that accentuate the 
differences between racial groups and further the fade in empathy towards these groups. 
A natural counterargument to the claims made thus far is that people do not derive their 
motivation to act morally from affect, but rather rely almost exclusively on general moral ideals 
that are more subservient to the rules of logic. In ardent opposition to this counterclaim is a 
mountain of evidence arguing that affect plays an extraordinarily important role in motivating 
or demotivating individuals to act morally. Paul Slovic et al. argue that in cases of charity, 
“compassion shown towards victims has been found to decrease as the number of individuals in 
need of aid increases, identifiability of victims decreases, and proportion of victims helped 
declines” (Slovic et al. 4). Their study starts by asserting that there is no logical reason to give 
less money to a group of six children than to give to one child, for, if anything, logic would 
demand that the group of six should get more because there is six times the need. Slovic et al., 
however, show that since the affect is greater if just one identified child is helped, people give 
more money on average to one child than to the group of six. In a similar study, Slovic et al. 
demonstrate that in cases of charity, providing information about those who cannot be helped 
will demotivate the individual from helping those she can help. The negative affect associated 
with the children not helped induces a sense of pseudo-inefficacy great enough to counteract the 
positive affect that would be achieved by helping those other children that can be helped (Slovic 
et al. 4) These studies illustrate how affect, however illogical, plays a crucial role in motivating 
people to act morally. While these studies do not demonstrate racial bias in empathic responses, 
they give evidence to the argument that the fade in empathic affect across racial lines must 
account for a major fade in motivation to act altruistically towards those racial out-groups. 
3. DISGUST 
Disgust is generally believed to have played an evolutionary role in keeping communities 
free of contamination and disease; however, there is disagreement about the exact evolutionary 
role of social disgust. One theory, as developed by Martha Nussbaum, argues that social disgust 
has served to reconcile our mortal, animal bodies with our desire to live forever. Nussbaum 
posits: 
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So powerful is the desire to cordon ourselves off from our animality that we often don’t 
stop at feces, cockroaches, and slimy animals. We need a group of humans to bind 
ourselves against, who will come to exemplify the boundary line between the truly human 
and the basely animal. If those quasi-animals stand between us and our own animality, 
then we are one step further away from being animal and mortal ourselves. (107) 
In this quote, Nussbaum identifies disgust as a mechanism used to anchor ourselves as 
human beings by identifying and isolating the non-human. While this view is extremely limited 
in its ability to account for the evolutionary development of social disgust, it does illustrate how 
disgust is necessarily dehumanizing to some while simultaneously humanizing to others. 
Nussbaum correctly identifies this universally human phenomenon as an emotion relating to the 
physicality of the body, a kind of obsession with purity and health. Disgust, therefore, uses 
dehumanizing means, such as slavery and extermination, to cleanse the body politic of any 
deviation from humanity. 
Daniel Kelly, in his book, Yuck! The Nature and Moral Significance of Disgust, develops an 
alternative and superior model of disgust. His project identifies the original function of disgust 
as a mechanism that triggers the expulsion of toxic poisons and signals the threat of potentially 
contagious diseases. According to Kelly, emotional responses felt in disgusting situations protect 
us from becoming entangled with parasites and poisons that might be dangerous. This emotion 
came to involve a whole cluster of specific reactions such as the gape face, quick withdrawal of 
the body (especially of the face and mouth), and certain cognitive reactions such a sense of 
offensiveness and contamination. These reactions all served a biological purpose, but over the 
course of many thousands of years eventually became associated with disgusting situations, and 
thus developed a communicative function. This was useful for groups that wanted to ensure the 
health of the entire community so that they could avoid the spread of disease. 
Kelly argues that since the same mechanisms that produce the emotion are also at work in 
the recognition of the emotion, “not only are people able to naturally recognize a gape as an 
expression of disgust, but doing so often involves the extra step of actually becoming disgusted 
oneself” (Kelly 2011. Pg 66). Thus, disgust is highly empathic and, ironically, extremely 
contagious. While the reaction and recognition of disgust are universal and innate functions that 
all people share, the elicitors of disgust are highly variable and are largely determined by social 
norms and susceptible to social learning. What accounts for the wide variety of disgust elicitors? 
Shouldn’t we expect all human beings to be disgusted by the same disgusting things? From an 
evolutionary standpoint, disgust has developed to be susceptible to social learning because 
human beings have historically been such a nomadic species. The requirements of adapting to 
new environments (learning what is and is not safe to eat, drink or touch, and communicating 
that knowledge to others) have been paramount in the success of the human species.  
But what gives disgust its moral and social orientation? Why has disgust been applied to the 
behavior of human beings? Kelly argues that at some point, the emotion had to be directed at 
specific groups of human beings infected with dangerous diseases. He argues, “the importance 
of socially acquired information about the specific poisons and parasites in the local habitat . . . 
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helped shape an acquisition system that was highly flexible. This combination of features left the 
emotion susceptible to accruing new auxiliary functions, particularly in the social domain” 
(Kelly 116). Kelly then argues that because disgust is the perfect candidate for motivating the 
strict adherence to social norms of the in-group and for punishing those who violate the norms 
(likely members of the out-group), the emotion was then co-opted to maintain these social 
norms. The maintenance of these norms was crucial for the survival of the human species, and 
was only possible through motivating each individual in a group to respect and comply with the 
norms. 
Kelly argues that the obsession with norm unanimity further facilitated the coordination 
between individuals, which resulted in the benefit of the entire community. Disgust interpreted 
arbitrary ethnic markers (such as skin color) to have socially relevant meaning. Thus treating 
those ethnic markers as “an external, physical, and observable indicator of an underlying set of 
internal, psychological, and unobservable dispositions, namely, the beliefs, values, and clusters 
of social norms endemic to one particular tribe...” (Kelly 112). Disgust began to operate on the 
premise that the greater the similarity in values and norms, the more likely another is to 
cooperate, and since racial differences were thought to be telling of values and norms, racial 
differences were interpreted to be indicators of cooperativeness. Therefore, strong racial-group 
animus was formed and the encounter of racially different groups was likely to elicit social 
disgust. Once again, aversions to racial out-groups are not innate but rather were created 
through a process of attributing social meanings that operated as an indicator of group 
membership and cooperativeness to certain physically salient features (such as skin color).  
Social disgust is elicited in a very different way than the original emotion of disgust, as the 
former is usually concerned with the protection of social norms and values whereas the latter is 
concerned with biological preservation. However, both forms of disgust produce the same 
cluster of emotional and physical reactions. Social disgust has communicative meaning and 
social significance. Since disgust has empathic capabilities, disgust elicited by out-group 
behavior or appearance is easily communicated, understood, and spread to fellow in-group 
members. The infectious capabilities of disgust combine with its visceral affective response to 
produce a widespread motivation in in-group members to isolate or eliminate members of the 
out-group. Such a response is likely to reify ethnocentrism and xenophobia into such atrocities 
as segregation, indiscriminate violence, and genocide. Therefore, by motivating people to both 
comply with social norms and punish those who violate those norms, disgust encourages and 
facilitates the dehumanizing treatment of racial minority groups. 
While Kelly’s work on disgust offers a reasonable account of the origins and co-option of 
social disgust, he says little about how disgust has been deliberately co-opted by human beings 
as a tool of rhetoric. Hitler famously compared Jews to vermin and maggots before and during 
World War II to mobilize a fierce sense of anti-Semitism. Is this rhetorical technique unique to 
mid-20th century Germany? Surely it is not, judging by the comments of Israeli leaders such as 
Miri Regev, who stated the African immigrants in Israel “are a cancer in our body”, a comment 
which over half of Israelis agree (“The Peace Index”). The recent comment made by Ugandan 
President Yoweri Museveni displays a similar group attribution of disgust, justifying the passage 
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of new, bellicose laws against homosexuals by saying: “They’re disgusting. What sort of people 
are they?” (Abedine). Invoking disgust as a rhetorical device to manipulate public opinion or to 
justify hostile group animus appears to be a worldwide phenomenon. 
In an analysis of different pieces of rhetoric that have been used to incite disgust in the 
public over the years, there seems to be a very common technique utilized: bodily metaphors. By 
comparing a group of people to diseases, insects, vermin, parasites, or feces, the speaker is able 
to effectively elicit a strong feeling of disgust in her listeners. Even though the listeners know 
that the out-group is not a “cancer” or “parasite”, the rhetoric successfully conflates the original 
feelings of disgust with those co-opted feelings of social disgust, resulting in the motivation to 
handle the elicitors of the disgust as if they are actually diseased and infectious. Another potent 
tool is the utilization of the strong emotional power of sexuality by comparing the infiltration of 
new out-groups to the rape of society. This is also often accompanied with portraying the out-
group as hypersexual and animalistic, effectively causing the in-group to have genuine worries 
of sexual violence. Thus, the close relationship between the obsession of biological purity and 
that of social purity has allowed rhetoric to conflate the two, causing for a more dramatic affect 
and thus a stronger motivation to act violently. 
In her essay Genocidal Language Games, Lynne Tirrell explains how hateful speech acts had 
an especially strong effect in evoking fear and disgust that motivated and justified the violence 
perpetrated by Hutus against Tutsis in the 1994 Rwanda Genocide. The derogatory terms with 
the most significance were “inyenzi”, which is Kinyarwanda for “cockroach”, and “inzoka”, which 
is Kinyarwanda for “snake”. In addition to accentuating the “us” and “them” distinctions, these 
terms rendered the Tutsis as subhuman animals, which effectively eliminated their membership 
in the moral community. Tirrell identifies the metaphorical significance of the term “cockroach” 
when she states, “cockroaches are pests, dirty, ubiquitous, multiply rapidly, are hard to kill, 
ought to be killed, show emergent tendencies when in groups, are resilient, (and) carry diseases” 
(200). Snakes, on the other hand, are generally treated with extreme caution and thus usually 
beheaded immediately. In fact, in Rwanda, the beheading of a snake is a certain kind of rite of 
passage for young boys, and thus the execution of a snake is a conferment of communal trust 
and pride (Tirrell 176). Tirrell argues that the comparison to insects and snakes is no accident, 
but instead a deliberate attempt to incite strong feelings of disgust and transform those feelings 
into the performance of violence. Upon considering Tirrell’s arguments about the reification of 
disgust-laden language into performative violence, Kelly’s evolutionary account of disgust, and 
words from leaders around the world, it becomes apparent that disgust plays a very active and 
palpable role in shaping in-group and, out-group distinctions. Once these distinctions are 
created, this destructive emotion wastes no time in motivating its hosts to eliminating out-group 
members, either socially (i.e. shunning) or physically (i.e. extermination). 
4. CONCLUSION 
It is evident that the oppression of certain groups can be largely understood on the basis of 
two emotional mechanisms, empathy and disgust. Both emotions are heavily influenced and 
affected by the perception of group membership, a perception that is easily manipulated and 
Oregon Undergraduate Research Journal  Harris 
Volume 7 Issue 1 Fall 2014   
 
46	  
transmitted through the collective consciousness. Empathy and disgust developed to maintain 
and bolster the welfare of the in-group. Empathy encourages prosocial behavior within the 
group and disgust discourages prosocial behavior towards the out-group. Disgust also enhances 
group separation on the basis of what is considered socially relevant, which allows group bias in 
the elicitation of empathy to grow. Physically salient differences, such as skin color, have been 
interpreted to have social and moral significance, allowing cultural prejudice to build hierarchies 
based on these physical differences. Since the perception of in-group and out-group 
membership has served as the basis for how disgust accentuates and how empathy collapses the 
borders between people, perception must therefore be altered if the present racial relations in 
the United States are to be improved. To prevent the reification of oppressive and atrocious 
group biases into strict hierarchal systems, group membership must be extended to include 
people across socioeconomic and racial lines. By including more people into one’s in-group, the 
negative effects of social disgust will be largely avoided and the potential positive effects of 
empathy will be communally enjoyed. 
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